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abstract
This article examines China’s strategies for and constraints on protecting and im-
plementing children’s and young people’s rights to education, employment and so-
cial and political participation. It shows that the 1978 policy of reform and opening 
to the world brought forth significant domestic economic and social changes and 
exposed China and its people to the world. All this, in turn, created new demands 
and concerns for the development of youth education, work and citizenship. The 
article further shows that in China, these three domains of youth have been influ-
enced by changing domestic and global contexts, and the state has played a vital 
role in facilitating these changes in three major spheres of youth. China, however, 
has also been confronted with equity issues arising from new developments in 
these domains.
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IN TRODUC TION
Providing youth with an education that improves their life, transitions them 
to economic productivity, and prepares them to become active, functioning 
citizens is a longstanding international concern. The People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), founded by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1949, is no 
exception. The article examines China’s strategies for and constraints on 
protecting and implementing children’s and young people’s rights to educa-
tion, employment and social and political participation. It argues that since 
the 1980s, China has played an important role in developing and improving 
these three domains in response to changing domestic and global contexts. It 
has also been confronted with equity issues arising from new developments 
in these domains.
After introducing the background of the PRC, this article discusses the 
challenges confronting and protection of young people’s right to education. 
Then, it examines China’s shift from a centrally planned to a market ori-
ented labour market, its adoption of international labour norms, its strate-
gies for easing youth unemployment and the problems arising from these 
Education, Work, and Citizenship of Youth in 
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strategies. Thirdly, it investigates the PRC’s strategies for engaging children 
and young people in CPC-organized social and political activities in schools 
and workplaces, and the tension between their participating in a political 
space constrained by structural inequalities against non-CPC members and 
participating in a social space broadened by the emergence of civil society 
and expansion of cyberspace.
THE GENER A L CON TEX T OF EDUC ATION, 
WOR K A ND CITIZENSHIP FOR CHINESE YOU THS
Like many countries, the PRC has no commonly agreed-on age ranges for 
youth (qingnian) and young people (qingshaonian ren) (Mo, 2009). One Chinese 
dictionary defines youth as the 15-30 age cohort, while the age range for Chi-
na’s Top 10 Outstanding Youths competition is 18-39 (Y. K. Hu, Zheng, Chen 
& Wang, 2011). The CPC, which has ruled China since 1949, admits young-
sters (shaonian) to the China Young Pioneers (CYP) and youths to the China 
Communist Youth League (CCYL) between 6 and 14, and between 14 and 28, 
respectively (China Communist Youth League National Congress, 2008; China 
Young Pioneers National Congress, 2005). For comparison purposes, this ar-
ticle adopts the United Nations’ (2001) definition of youth as the 15-24 age 
cohort; it is difficult, however, to strictly adhere to this definition when 
discussing basic education and employment, as both could involve people 
outside this age range. The terms, youth and young people, are used inter-
changeably herein.
The PRC has the largest population in the world, some 1.34 billion people in 
2010, the majority of whom (91.5%) are ethnic Han, with 55 other ethnicities 
accounting for the balance (8.5%) (Population Census Office under the State 
Council & National Bureau of Statistics, 2011a). The age cohorts 0-14 and 15-24 
were over 221 million (16.6% of total population) and 227 million (17.1%), respec-
tively; in other words, each cohort was about three-quarters of the US popula-
tion. Since 1949, the CPC has dominated China’s governance from the state to 
the village level. Diplomatically, China’s foreign relations were mainly limited 
to other socialist states during the Mao period (1949-76), but were extended to 
include capitalist countries thereafter. This diversification has exposed the 
PRC more to the international community and to international norms and 
practices in various domains, including education and work.
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In 1978, the PRC introduced a policy of reform and opening to the world, 
adopting five major strategies to revive its declining socialist economy (Law, 
2011). First, it accessed and utilized foreign (particularly Western) capital, 
knowledge and technology. Second, it changed its economy to socialist mar-
ket orientation by allowing the coexistence of central planning and market 
forces and, therefore, of the state and private sectors. Third, it adopted a 
differential approach to development, letting some areas (such as coastal ar-
eas and special economic zones) and people to get rich first. Fourth, the PRC 
gradually shifted its economic focus from primary to tertiary industries. 
Primary, secondary, and tertiary industries accounted for 28.2%, 47.9%, and 
23.9% of GDP, respectively, in 1978, and for 10.0%, 46.6%, and 43.4% in 2011 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2012b). Fifth, China increased the pace of ur-
banization, with urban populations rising from 21% in 1982, to 26.4% in 1990 
and 49.7% in 2010 (Population Census Office under the State Council & Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics, 2011b).
As a result, the PRC became the world’s second largest economy (after the 
US) in 2010, and its per capita GDP rose over 90 fold, from RMB381 in 1978 to 
RMB35,083 in 2011 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012a). At the same time, 
however, the income gap between rich and poor has grown, as have such 
developmental problems as economic disparity between and within regions, 
inflation, rural to urban domestic migration, pollution, and social unrest 
and conflict.
EDUC ATION
The PRC has the largest education system in the world, including pre-school 
programmes (for children under 6), nine-year compulsory basic education 
for all (EFA) (primary and junior secondary education for children 6-14), se-
nior secondary (regular and vocational/technical) education (ages 15-17), and 
higher education. In 2011-12, it had over 254 million students: about 34 mil-
lion in 166,800 pre-schools; 99 million in 241,200 primary schools; 51 million in 
54,100 junior-secondary schools; 47 million in 27,600 senior-secondary schools; 
398,700 in 1,767 special schools; and 23 million in 2,409 higher-education in-
stitutes (Ministry of Education, 2012a). Since the 1980s, China has attached 
higher importance to education and to protecting the rights of children and 
young people to education through legislation, nine-year compulsory EFA, and 
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expanded post-EFA education. These efforts, however, could not completely 
eradicate structural inequalities and social discrimination, as reflected in 
widening intra- and extra-regional educational disparities, and in children of 
rural-to-urban domestic migrants being deprived of their educational rights.
measures to protect children’s 
and young people’s rights to education
The PRC’s national leaders have seen education as an important means to 
improve the quality of China’s labour force and its national strength in an 
increasingly competitive world. In 1949, nearly 80% of China’s population 
was illiterate, representing a huge barrier to national development and 
modernization. After its 1978 opening to the world, China sought to turn 
its huge population into a national asset and stressed the need to gear edu-
cation towards modernization, the world and the future. In 1995, the PRC 
emphasized the role of education and science in national prosperity (kejiao 
xingguo). Despite its instrumentalist approach, China has taken serious steps, 
including legislation and the expansion of education, to protect children’s 
and youths’ rights to education.
China used legislation to protect its citizens’ right to education and to 
commit itself to providing education at different levels. It followed the 
spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights regarding everyone’s right to 
education, including free and compulsory education at elementary and fun-
damental levels, and various forms of post-compulsory education (United 
Nations, 1948, Article 26). Specifically, the National People’s Congress (NPC, 
China’s highest law-making body), in revising China’s Constitution in 1982, 
stipulated that Chinese citizens have the duty and right to receive an educa-
tion, whereas the state has the obligation to wipe out illiteracy, run schools 
of various types, provide compulsory primary education, and develop post-
compulsory (secondary, vocational, and post-secondary) education (National 
People’s Congress, 2004, Articles 19 and 46). In 1986, the NPC codified the 
principle of equal educational opportunity, stipulating that all children 
over the age of six should receive compulsory EFA, irrespective of gender, 
ethnicity, race or physical condition (Articles 5 and 9). A decade later, the 
NPC (1996) passed the Vocational Education Law, recognizing the strategic 
importance of vocational education to labour, employment and economic 
and social development in China, ensuring citizens’ right to vocational edu-
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cation, and requiring the state to develop, reform and support vocational 
education, including in rural, remote and poverty-stricken areas (Articles 3, 
5, and 7); in the Higher Education Law (1998), it stipulated that all citizens 
enjoy the right to higher education (Article 1). This law requires the state 
to help ethnic minorities and financially-disadvantaged students receive a 
higher education, and universities and colleges to admit disabled students 
who meet admission standards.
To extend the right of children and youths to education, China adopted a 
differential approach to educational development, expanding different lev-
els of education at different stages. In the mid-1980s, China began pursuing 
EFA, because this could improve the quality of Chinese workers at the lowest 
and largest labour market stratum. In addition, China used two populariza-
tion strategies: regionalization by setting different goals and timelines for 
eastern/coastal, middle and western parts of the country; and devolution of 
major administrative and financial responsibilities to local governments. 
As a result, China achieved universal primary education in 2010, increasing 
net enrolment rates from 93% in 1980 to 99.1% (China Education Yearbook 
Editorial Team, 2011); that same year, it achieved universal junior secondary 
education, raising gross enrolment rates to 100%, up from 66.7% in 1990. In 
2012, the overall EFA retention rate was 92% (Y. Liu, 2013). In other words, 
China instituted EFA ahead of the United Nations’ millennium goal of all 
children able to complete a full course of primary schooling by 2015 (World 
Bank, 2002); moreover, it extended EFA to include junior secondary school-
ing, three years more than the UN called for.
In addition, China moved to equip youths to fill the middle and upper 
strata of the labour market by expanding post-EFA education – senior sec-
ondary and higher education – in the early and late 1990s, respectively. The 
number of new senior secondary students drastically increased from 4.8 mil-
lion in 1990 to 8.1 million in 2000 and 15.9 million in 2010; higher education 
(including degree- and sub-degree programmes) enrolments rose from 0.6 
million (7.2% of age cohort) in 1995 to 2.2 million (12.5%) in 2000 and 6.6 mil-
lion (26.5%) in 2010 (Ministry of Education, 2011). According to Trow’s (1970) 
criteria, Chinese higher education has shifted from an elitist orientation 
(enrolling below 15% of age cohort) to massification (15-50%). Senior second-
ary and higher education will further expand due to China’s decision to in-
crease gross admission rates to 90% and 40%, respectively, by 2020  (Commu-
nist Party of China Central Committee & State Council, 2010). 
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China’s remarkable achievement in EFA, however, does not mean it has 
no dropout problem. In the 2000s, junior secondary dropout rates rose, par-
ticularly in some poor rural areas (Yi et al., 2012). Research shows three 
main types of dropout students: students with serious learning difficulties; 
students from extremely poor families, and students left behind in rural ar-
eas by parents who migrated to urban areas for work (L. Q. Li, 2013). As such, 
the central government asked local governments to increase EFA retention 
rates to 95% of age cohort by 2020, up from 91% in 2009 (Communist Party of 
China Central Committee & State Council, 2010). 
Competition for higher education spaces remains acute, however. Accord-
ing to the UN Development Programme’s (2013) Human Development Report, 
recent higher education enrolment rates in China are lower (25.9% of age 
cohort) than in the West (e.g., 94.8% in the United States, 58.5% in the United 
Kingdom) and in Asia and the Pacific (e.g., 75.9% in Australia, 59% in Japan). 
The same report ranked China 101st in human development among the UN 
member states.
equity issues confronting education 
for children and young people
Chinese children and youths face issues at various levels, including widen-
ing regional education disparities and the marginalization in EFA and post-
EFA of non-local children whose parents’ household is registered elsewhere 
in China.
1. Widening of Educational Disparities in EFA Between and Within Regions
Since the implementation of EFA in the late 1990s, the focus of children’s 
right to education has shifted from equal access to education to equity in 
education standards. The widening of intra- and extra-regional education-
al disparities, in terms of per student expenditures, teacher-student ratio, 
teacher qualifications and school conditions and facilities, (Project Team of 
a Case Study on Key Educational Policy in Transitional China, 2005) disad-
vantages students from poor areas or poor families, and is a matter of na-
tional concern.
This inequity can be interpreted as resulting from three main, inter-
related problems. First, low public education expenditures; despite having 
promised to do so since the early 1990s, China did not raise public educa-
education, work, and citizenship of youth in china: strategies, achievements (…) 135
tion expenditure until 2012, and then only to 4% of GDP (about 20% of state 
expenditures) (Y. Liu, 2013) – on par with lower-middle income countries, 
but below the world average of 4.6% (World Bank, 2012). Second, uneven 
distribution of school financial resources, due to local governments’ diffi-
culties in generating revenue, particularly taxes, in different areas because 
of China’s differential approach to economic development. Third, fee abuse; 
to augment low government subsidy rates, many schools asked parents to 
pay illegal sponsorship fees (based on school reputation) to ensure a school 
place, admitted students to elite classes with better teachers if their parents 
were willing to pay more, and charged for tutorial or supplementary lessons 
after school or during holidays (Law & Pan, 2009). As a result, inter- and 
intra-school disparities within and between regions widened, as did inequi-
ties in standards of education and student participation (Project Team of a 
Case Study on Key Educational Policy in Transitional China, 2005). 
To address these equity issues, China introduced, in 2001, its “two exemp-
tions and one subsidy” (liangmian yibu) policy, requiring the central govern-
ment to buy the textbooks for students from poor families, exempting them 
from miscellaneous local fees and subsidizing their boarding expenses. In 
addition, the NPC (2006) revised the Compulsory Education Law, forbidding 
schools from levying miscellaneous fees or charging for tutorials, and ask-
ing central and provincial governments to take additional financial respon-
sibility for EFA to ease financial burdens at the county or local levels. In 
the late 2000s, these two measures (among others), seemed to slow, slightly, 
the growth of educational disparities in four provinces (Shandong, Henan, 
Shaanxi and Gansu) (Zhai & Sun, 2012). Moreover, in the early 2010s, Chi-
na piloted a nutrition scheme for 30 million students in 481 poor and 699 
extremely poor counties, to improve the health of students in rural areas 
(Y. Liu, 2013). Despite these efforts, intra- and extra-regional disparities be-
tween schools remain a serious national concern, and the CPC Central Com-
mittee and State Council (2010) have called on central and local governments 
to reduce them significantly by 2020. 
2. Marginalization of Domestic Migrant Students’ Rights to Local Public Education
In the mid-1990s, the rights of domestic migrant students, whose par-
ents’ registered domicile was elsewhere in China, to EFA and post-EFA in 
host areas began to become a serious social concern, revealing an important 
gap in China’s efforts to ensure people’s rights to education. Although the 
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rights of migrant children and young people to EFA and post-EFA education 
are protected by national laws, the realization of these rights in host areas 
is localized, and constrained by national household registration policy and 
related measures.
Since the beginning of economic reform in the 1980s, the unequal na-
tional pace of modernization and urbanization has resulted in surplus rural 
labour and a wave of economically-driven domestic migration. In 2011, there 
were 230 million domestic migrants, about one-sixth of China’s population 
(National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2012). Commonly, af-
ter settling in host areas, single migrant workers marry and have children, 
while some married migrant workers bring their children with them. Thus, 
the population of migrant children aged below 18 rose drastically, from 19.8 
million in 2000 to 38 million in 2010 (Hua, 2007; Wu, 2012). 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, migrant children were deprived of equal ac-
cess to EFA in host areas, despite their parents’ important economic contri-
butions to those areas. Household registration regulations (National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee, 1958) tie people’s rights to political election, 
public education, and social welfare and public housing to their domicile 
registration; domestic migrants cannot exercise those rights unless they re-
turn to their original domicile. The policy also assigns local governments 
the administrative and financial responsibility for providing these rights to 
citizens whose registered domicile in their jurisdiction.
The policy caused serious education problems for both migrant children 
and local governments in host areas. Public schools were very reluctant 
to enrol migrant students due to the lack of subsidy from host and source 
area governments. To compensate, they often charged migrant students a 
“school-place rental fee” (jiedu fei), while some schools, particularly famous 
ones, asked migrant parents to pay a sponsorship and/or school selection fee 
– in Beijing in the early 2000s, the former came to about RMB480 per term, 
while the latter reached RMB20,000-30,000 (L. Wang, 2008). Most migrant 
parents could not afford these fees on a monthly household income of be-
tween RMB800 and RMB1,500. 
Thus, many migrant parents preferred to send their children to illegal, 
private schools with lower fees. These schools began to flourish in the 1990s, 
growing, in Beijing, from one school in 1993 to 241 schools in 2006, and pro-
viding places for nearly one-third of migrant children (Wen, 2007). How-
ever, most migrant-children schools employed unqualified headmasters and 
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teachers, had serious hygiene and fire safety problems, and had sub-stan-
dard facilities (Kwong, 2004; Law & Pan, 2009). 
Many migrant parents could not afford tuition fees even in these ille-
gal schools and kept their children home; in 1997, 14% of Beijing’s 80,000 
migrant children aged 6-15 were not in school (China National Children’s 
Centre, 2003). Moreover, migrant children were further disadvantaged by 
their family’s comparatively limited financial resources (Hua, 2007). Many 
migrant parents had less time to focus on their children’s studies and had 
difficulty helping with homework because they worked long work and were 
not well-educated. Moreover, they had no extra money to support extracur-
ricular activities or hire private tutors for examination drills.
In 2003, the State Council introduced an administrative measure requir-
ing host area governments to provide eligible migrant children with equal 
opportunity to nine-year EFA, later codified in the 2006 revised Basic Educa-
tion Law (National People’s Congress, 2006, Article 12). In response, many lo-
cal governments gradually abolished illegal private migrant-student schools, 
transferring many of their pupils to public schools. In 2011-12, 12.6 million 
migrant children were enrolled in nine-year compulsory public education: 
9.3 million in primary and 3.3 million in junior secondary (Ministry of Edu-
cation, 2012a). China has promised to enroll at least 90% of eligible migrant 
children in EFA in their host areas (All-China Women’s Federation, 2013); 
however, this means a large portion of migrant children still cannot enjoy 
EFA in public schools for various reasons.
In the early 2010s, the problem of migrant children education began to 
extend into public senior secondary and higher education, to which they were 
not entitled in host areas. To deal with this, in 2012, four ministries jointly 
issued a circular asking local governments to allow migrant workers to take 
public examinations for admission to post-compulsory education in host areas 
(Ministry of Education, National Development and Reform Commission, Min-
istry of Public Security, & Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 
2012); in 2013, one municipality (Chongqing) and 11 provinces (of 31 administra-
tive areas) agreed to allow eligible migrant students to sit college entrance ex-
aminations, with another 11 provinces expected to follow suit in 2014 and three 
more in 2015. Some local governments, however, set non-academic eligibility 
criteria for examinations, such as evidence of their parents’ stable occupation 
and residence, and buying social insurance (a state-run, comprehensive insur-
ance plan covering areas such as health and unemployment). 
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Four administrative areas (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong and Tianjin) did 
not show a strong desire to open up their public university education to mi-
grant students. These areas have famous national universities and the largest 
population of migrant workers and their children; in Shanghai, for example, 
migrants make up 42% of the local population (10 million). Beijing’s migrant 
student admission criteria are the harshest of the four; beginning in 2014, 
migrant students will have access to tertiary vocational/technical institutes 
offering sub-degree programmes, but not to universities degree programs (Bei-
jing Municipal Government, 2012). Underlying these responses is a subtle is-
sue – how to ensure and balance the rights of local and migrant children and 
youth in highly-mobilized China. Stringent non-academic criteria likely re-
duce migrant students’ admissibility and ability to compete equally with local 
students, whereas low non-academic criteria likely invite an influx of migrant 
students into local higher education to the disadvantage of local students.
EMPLOYMEN T
Since the 1980s, economic reform in the PRC has changed the nature of the 
youth labour market from one that is centrally-planning to one that is mar-
ket oriented, determined by supply and demand. This has led to new employ-
er/employee relationships and problems, and has caused serious youth em-
ployment issues in urban and rural areas across the country. To tackle these 
new challenges, China has legislated employment rights for workers (includ-
ing youths) in the emerging market economy, expanded post-EFA education 
to delay youths’ entry into the labour market, and allowed rural youth (and 
adult) workers to look for jobs in urban areas. The implementation of these 
measures, however, revealed the inadequacy of legislation protecting work-
ers’ rights and created new employment problems, such as intensified job 
competition among post-EFA graduates and structural and social discrimina-
tion against youth migrant workers in the labour market and society.
shift in the labour market from centrally- planned to 
market-oriented
Formerly, the Chinese state overwhelmingly controlled the means of produc-
tion and allocation of resources, and was almost the country’s sole employ-
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er. Youth employment was not a major problem because after graduation, 
students were guaranteed jobs based on state needs and plans; in this way, 
youth unemployment was hidden. For example, during the Cultural Revolu-
tion (1967 – 1976), millions of urban youth were sent to work in the country-
side as “a shortcut to solving employment pressure and possible youthful 
resistance” arising from the closure of schools and universities (Yan & Gao, 
1996, p. 281).
When the market economy began to take root in the early 1990s and the 
state sector of the labour market contracted, youth employment in urban 
and rural areas became a serious national problem. Many urban state-own 
enterprises and factories were downsized or even privatized and numerous 
state workers laid off, and the state stopped arranging jobs for school or col-
lege graduates (except those who had received professional scholarships or 
who had been specifically recruited by, for example, military universities). 
On the other hand, the private sector labour market bloomed and numer-
ous private enterprises were established and became new employers. People, 
including school leavers or college graduates, were allowed to choose and 
compete for employers, and vice versa. This diversified and complicated em-
ployment relationships, and generated new relations and conflicts among 
the state, workers and employers in the labour market.
youth’s employment and labour rights
Before the 1980s, the PRC enacted few specific labour rights laws; by the 
1990s, however, youth and young adult employment and labour rights had 
begun to be recognized and protected through legislation. In 1983, the PRC 
began to be active in the International Labour Organization (ILO) and to in-
crease its efforts to protect labour rights. In the 1990s, China began to change 
its role from labour market monopoliser to macro-regulator, using law to 
guide the transition from central planning to a market economy, and to ad-
dress problems and issues arising during the transition. The NPC Standing 
Committee (1994) promulgated the Labour Law, covering all employers and 
employees, including youths, and incorporating important international la-
bour standards.
Firstly, the PRC forbade child labour, adopting the ILO’s (1973, 1999) con-
ventions on child labour and minimum age. While the 1986 Compulsory 
Education Law ensured children’s free access to EFA, the 1994 Labour Law 
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defined 16, the age of most EFA graduates, as the minimum employment 
age. The PRC also enacted special measures protecting the safety and health 
of employed minors, aged 16-18 (wei chengnian gong), through the Ministry of 
Labour’s (1994) Regulations on Special Protection for Minor Workers; for ex-
ample, minors have to obtain State Council approval before finding employ-
ment. Hazardous occupations such as mining were not allowed to employ 
minors, and employers are required to provide minor workers with pre-em-
ployment vocational training and occupational safety and health education, 
provide health checks before and after one year of employment, and adjust 
the amount and/or type of their work, if necessary. 
Secondly, the PRC protected youth and adult labour rights by ratifying 
ILO (1951, 1958, 1981) conventions on pay equity, discrimination, and occu-
pational safety and health. The 1994 Labour Law of China mandates work-
ers’ freedom to choose their occupation, equal opportunity for employment 
and promotion (regardless of ethnicity, gender or religion), pay equity, and 
occupational safety and health. Together with the 1992 Trade Unions Law 
(National People’s Congress, 2001), it gives workers the freedom to join and 
organize trade unions. To protect employee health, the Labour Law limits 
work hours to not more than eight hours a day or 44 hours per week, and 
limits overtime to not more than one hour a day in normal circumstances, 
or three hours a day or 36 hours per month in special circumstances. The 
Labour Law also follows the spirit of the ILO’s (1921) Weekly Rest Convention, 
stipulating that employees are legally entitled to weekly rest days and leave 
on public holidays, such as first day of a year, spring festivals, and National 
Day (1 October). 
Thirdly, the PRC began to promote contracts to further govern relation-
ships between employers and employees and regulate both parties’ practices 
and behaviours. The 1994 Labour Law follows the spirit of the ILO’s (1949) 
convention on contracts, and requires employer and employee to conclude a 
labour contract wherein a labour relationship is established. The legal status 
of contracts in the socialist market economy was reinforced by the enact-
ment of the Labour Contract Law, which stipulates contract contents and 
process, the contractual rights and obligations of employers and employees, 
and the conditions and procedure for contract termination, including layoff 
(National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 2007). It also highlights 
the importance of the law, fairness, equality, consent, integrity and trust 
in concluding a contract, forbids compulsory overtime, requires employers 
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to pay employees for overtime, and does not allow employers to dismiss em-
ployees who are pregnant or sick during their contract period. The law was 
later revised to prevent discrimination against “temporary workers”, stipu-
lating equal remuneration for equal work by temporary and regular employ-
ees (National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 2012). 
Despite these legal efforts, the PRC has been criticized as having poor re-
cord of protecting labour rights (Q. Yang, 2006). According to the ILO (2013), 
the PRC ratified 25 (of nearly 190) ILO conventions, with 22 in force, as of early 
2013. Trade unions are required to uphold the CPC’s leadership and its policies 
(National People’s Congress, 2001, Article 4). Chinese workers have no right to 
strike or to collective bargaining, and may only join or organize trade unions 
that fall within the monopoly of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (Ju-
lie, 2010). Finally, penal forced labour still exists; for example, in 2009, about 
190,000 inmates were interred in 320 labor camps (Yu, 2013). 
youth employment problems
Youth employment is a thorny international issue, with the global youth 
unemployment rate rising from 11.9% in 2007 to 13% in 2009 (United Na-
tions, 2010). It has also long been a pressing issue in the PRC; in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, 20 million people in urban areas were unemployed 
(H. S. Li, 2008). Officially, unemployment among youths aged 16-24 dropped 
from 6.3% in 2000, to 3.7% in 2010 (Population Census Office under the State 
Council & National Bureau of Statistics, 2001, 2011a), falling below global av-
erages. Some studies, however, suggest China’s actual youth unemployment 
rate could be higher – 35.3% of the urban 16-24 age cohort in 1997, and 9% 
of the 15-29 national age cohort in 2005 (S. L. Zhang, 2010). In addition to 
revitalizing local economies to create jobs, and allowing self-employment 
and private businesses, China used, in the 1990s, two main strategies to ease 
youth employment: expanding post-EFA education and allowing the large-
scale domestic migration of youth labour, particularly those with junior or 
senior secondary education qualifications. These solutions, however, gave 
rise to new problems.
1. Keen Competition of Post-EFA Graduates for Jobs in the High-end Labour Market
The first strategy was to delay the entry of young people into the labour 
market by educating them for as long as possible; to that end, and also to 
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enhance Chinese workers’ ability to compete globally, in the 1990s China ex-
panded senior secondary and higher education. In 2011, this kept 15.9 million 
junior secondary graduates and 6.6 million senior secondary graduates in 
school for from three to seven additional years. The strategy, however, could 
only delay, not resolve, youth employment problems.
In the early 2000s, employment problems faced by highly qualified 
youths began to emerge in urban areas. The expansion of post-EFA education 
had intensified employment competition among graduates, as there were 
fewer new jobs created in the high-end labour market than there were post-
EFA graduates. In the 1990s, there were 7.5 million degree- and sub-degree 
graduates, equalling about 10% of the 76 million new jobs created in the same 
period; in the 2000s, although the number of new jobs nearly doubled, to 130 
million, the number of graduates more than quadrupled, increasing labour 
market competition (R. W. Hu, Zhang & Zhu, 2013). Graduates from the Hu-
manities (including Arts, History, Philosophy, Law and Education) are less 
likely to get jobs, as China’s economic reform and urbanization has created 
a greater demand for Business Administration, Engineering and Science 
graduates. Moreover, due in part to lower unit training costs, the number 
of Humanities graduates increased five-fold from 2002 to 2010, compared to 
a three-fold increase among non-Humanities graduates; the labour market 
could not accommodate the glut (C. M. Zhang, 2013).
Second, post-EFA graduates often take jobs that do not reflect their aspi-
rations. Many plan to work in first-tier cities like Beijing or Shanghai, but 
have to choose between taking white-collar employment elsewhere or blue-
collar work in the big cities. Between 1990 and 2010, the number of workers 
with senior secondary or college qualifications in white-collar occupations 
grew from 11 million to 52 million, while those in blue-collar occupations 
rose from just over 1 million to 23.5 million (R. W. Hu et al., 2013). 
Third, graduation does not guarantee employment; statistics say 21.8% 
of graduates in 2010 were unemployed, up from 20.4% of graduates in 2001 
(National Bureau of Statistics & Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security, 2011). In 2002, 44% of unemployed graduates had college qualifica-
tions and 26% had senior secondary qualifications (S. L. Zhang, 2010); these 
unemployed graduates are not covered by social security (S. L. Zhang, 2010), 
and many are a financial burden on their family.
The 1990s expansion of EFA education helped the PRC increase the quan-
tity and quality of workers for the high-end labour market, and temporarily 
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ease youth employment problems. This stopgap strategy, however, cannot 
resolve long-term employment problems facing youths when they finally en-
ter the labour market. Indeed, educational expansion has led to new youth 
unemployment problems and reflects the failure of manpower planning in 
China to link educational expansion to labour market needs. In developed 
or developing countries, lack of opportunities for employment and social 
mobility can foster youth dissatisfaction and social unrest (World Economic 
Forum, 2012). To avoid this, Chinese authorities need to be increasingly sen-
sitive to changing labour market needs, review its policy and planning in 
education and manpower, and adjust the supply of post-EFA graduates and 
create jobs for them.
2. Large-scale Domestic Migration of Labour Force in the Low-end Labour Market
China’s second strategy to ease employment problems, since the 1980s, 
has involved allowing surplus labour, particularly in rural areas, to move 
to urban or more developed areas between and within provinces, despite 
the household registration policy. This has led to an unprecedented, large-
scale domestic migration of workers and significantly increased youths’ geo-
graphical mobility and employment opportunities in the national low-end 
labour market, particularly for those with primary or secondary education 
qualifications. However, they still face unequal treatment and discrimina-
tion in the labour market and society.
The domestic migration population is marked by three major features. 
First, its growth is rapid and substantial, expanding from 70 million in 1993, 
to 144 million in 2000 and 230 million in 2011 (National Health and Fam-
ily Planning Commission, 2012). Youths account for a significant portion of 
the migrant population; about 30% were aged 15-24 in 2000, and 45% aged 
below 30 in 2010 (Gao, Cui & Chen, 2011). Second, geographically, about 80% 
domestic migration in 2011 flowed from rural to urban areas within and be-
tween provinces, and from western and middle regions (Anhui, Henan, and 
Hunan) to coastal regions (Guangdong, Zhejiang, Shanghai, Beijing, Jiangsu, 
and Fujian). Third, migrant workers often move from the primary sector 
(e.g., agriculture and fisheries) to secondary and tertiary sectors (e.g., un-
skilled workers, technical workers, and the service industry) (Song, 2010). 
Between the 1980s and 2000s, there were major changes in the young 
migrant worker population, creating what some scholars (e.g., C. G. Wang, 
2001) refer to as two generations. The first generation included those who 
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became migrant workers from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s. A majority 
of these had received primary education at best, no vocational training, and 
were separated from their parents, who stayed in their rural areas. The sec-
ond generation became migrant workers after the mid-1990s and were better 
educated, because EFA had been a fact in China since 1986. For example, in 
2012, 18.3% of the 6.2 million migrant workers in Chongqing Municipality 
had primary education, compared to 56.3% with junior secondary and 25.4% 
with senior secondary (Z. Q. Liu, 2013). Although their households were reg-
istered in rural areas, a significant portion of second-generation migrant 
workers were born, raised and lived in urban areas. Compared to their par-
ents, they have more ability and opportunity for development, but are less 
hardworking and persevering (Zhu, 2010).
Despite their contribution to the economy of host areas and China as a 
whole, migrant workers face unequal treatment and discrimination that pre-
vents them from integration into local communities. In the labour market, 
many migrant workers take jobs locals are reluctant to do, and receive lower 
pay than their local counterparts for the same type and amount of work. Many 
migrant workers often are forced to work long hours and have less job security. 
In 2011, the average migrant worked 54.6 hours per week (above the legal limit 
of 44 hours) and over 30% did not have an employment contract as required by 
law (National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2012). Migrant work-
ers’ employment rights are further reduced by their weak bargaining power, 
the fact that the supply of migrant labour exceeds market demands, weak en-
actment and enforcement of laws protect migrant employees, low awareness 
among migrant workers of their legal rights, insufficient legal aid, and a lack 
of NGOs to help workers fight for their rights (Song, 2010).
Many youth and adult migrant workers face social discrimination as well 
as employment barriers, and are largely marginalized in Chinese society (Mur-
phy & Fong, 2006). First, because of the household registration policy, migrant 
workers (and their children) are not entitled to the same rights and benefits 
as local citizens. Second, migrant workers are often discriminated against for 
their accents, life styles and habits, which differ from local people’s. Third, 
migrant workers often do not have a strong sense of belonging to their host 
areas; in 2011, 35% of migrant workers had not attended any social activities 
and fewer than 10% participated in elections or local competitions (National 
Health and Family Planning Commission, 2012). Psychologically, many mi-
grant workers, particularly younger ones, are not happy because of poor work-
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ing and living conditions, declining real income, and a dichotomy between 
their expected and actual career achievements (Knight & Gunatilaka, 2010). To 
many migrant workers, their host areas are mainly places for earning a living, 
rather than pursuing social commitment and integration.
POLITIC A L A ND SOCIA L PA RTICIPATION
In addition to education and the labour market, China’s policy of reform 
and opening to the world brought significant changes to Chinese youths’ 
political and social participation. Before the 1980s, youth social and political 
participation was often politically-driven, as when Mao Zedong turned over 
10 million high school and college students into militant Red Guards during 
the Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1976) (Clark, 2012). After the 1970s, China con-
tinued to recruit and engage children and youths in CPC activities in schools 
and workplaces nationwide. The space for youth political participation is 
still constrained by structural inequalities that favour those with CPC mem-
bership, but the potential for youth social participation has been broadened 
by the emergence of civil society and the dramatic expansion of cyberspace.
engagement of children and young people 
in the cpc’s political activities
To consolidate its leadership, the Chinese state has long engaged children 
and youth in social and political activities arranged by the CYP and CCYL, 
which penetrate campuses and workplaces, targeting different groups for 
similar political purposes – to reinforce their members’ affiliation and iden-
tification with the CPC.
The CYP focuses on student work in primary and junior secondary 
schools. According to its constitution, the CYP is led by the CCYL; it is the 
“school” in which children aged 6-14 (i.e., grade 1-9 students) learn about 
communism and are prepared to become “builders of socialist undertakings” 
(China Young Pioneers National Congress, 2005). In their swearing-in cer-
emony, CYP members are required to pledge their love and support for the 
CPC. They are entitled to wearing the CYP’s red league scarf; almost all stu-
dents wear this scarf. In CYP formal activities on campus, student members 
are required to sing their anthem We are the Successors of Communism and be “al-
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ways ready” to strive for communist undertakings when asked. The CYP also 
organizes social activities in which children participate in local community 
services, donate books and stationery, or offer environmental protection. To 
strengthen the CYP’s work on campus, in September, 2012, the Ministry of 
Education (2012b) made CYP activities state-mandated, compulsory activities 
in grades 1-8, requiring schools to arrange class time for CYP lessons.
Unlike the CYP, the CCYL targets young people in senior secondary schools, 
universities and the workplace. According to its constitution, the CCYL is the 
CPC’s “assistant and reserve force” and its “advanced youth group organiza-
tion”. It recruits members between the ages of 14 and 28. From 2002 to 2012, 
CCYL membership increased by about 30%, from 69.9 million to 89.9 million 
(L. H. Li, 2013); in 2012, the CCYL had a larger membership than the CPC (85.1 
million). The CCYL is very penetrative in society; in 2008, CCYL members ac-
counted for 26% (78.6 million) of the youth population (Y. J. Li, 2009). More 
than half (51%) were senior secondary or higher education students, 27% were 
farmers and primary industry workers, 7% were secondary industry work-
ers, and 15% were tertiary workers or from other industries. Similar to their 
CYP counterparts, CCYL members need to pledge love and support for the CPC. 
Their major duties include: studying CPC-prescribed political theories, such as 
Marxism-Leninism and the theories of China’s national leaders; helping dis-
seminate and implement the CPC’s party line and various policies; implement-
ing CCYL decisions and policies; receiving national defence education; and 
helping other young people and reflecting their views and requests to the CPC.
Because of its political mission and special status in the CPC, the CCYL has 
been a cradle and training school for Chinese leaders and a strong political 
counterbalance to other CPC factions. Before assuming their provincial or 
state posts, many Chinese leaders and officials occupied important CCYL lead-
ership posts, including Hu Yaobang (CPC General Secretary, 1982 – 1987), Hu 
Jintao (CPC General Secretary, 2002 – 2013; President of China, 2003 – 2013), 
and three of the five new cabinet members appointed to the State Council in 
March, 2013: Premier Li Keqiang, Vice-Premiers Liu Yandong and Wang Yang.
structural inequalities confronting  
youths’ political participation
The PRC is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, but has not ratified it yet. On paper, Chinese youths are constitution-
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ally entitled to freedom of religion, speech, publication, assembly, associa-
tion, procession and demonstration (National People’s Congress, 2004). Re-
gardless of race, gender, religion or socioeconomic status, citizens aged 18 or 
above also have the constitutional right to vote and stand for election. Simi-
lar to their adult counterparts, Chinese youths, however, confront structur-
al inequalities when participating in the existing political system, which 
favours individuals with CPC membership; party membership is important 
political capital among Chinese youths.
On the one hand, Chinese youths cannot form their own political parties 
without state approval. At its founding in 1949, the PRC officially recognized 
nine political parties: the CPC and eight others; since then, no new politi-
cal parties have been allowed to form and, if they seek political affiliation, 
Chinese youths must join one of the recognized political parties. Moreover, 
political discussion, publication or gatherings deemed a challenge to the 
CPC’s leadership is often suppressed, and political activists involved could 
be prosecuted and jailed for subverting state power and the socialist system. 
This limits the scope of Chinese youths’ political activities to those accept-
able to the CPC.
On the other hand, the differential treatment afforded the CPC and other 
political parties draws Chinese youths to the former. Firstly, the CPC is the 
largest political party in the PRC (and the world). Despite the global decline 
of socialism in the late 1980s and 1990s, CPC membership increased from 
about 28 million in 1973 to over 85.1 million (over 6% of China’s population) 
in 2012 (Zhou, 2013), 25.6% of whom were aged 35 or younger. The CPC over-
whelmingly outnumbers all non-CPC political parties, which had a total of 
fewer than 700,000 members in 2007 (State Council, 2007). Secondly, in the 
Chinese political structure, the CPC is positioned as the core of the leader-
ship and the ruling party, while the others are “participating parties” (can-
zheng dang) that may “participate in and deliberate on state affairs” but still 
fall under the CPC’s leadership (State Council, 2007). 
Thirdly, CPC membership can be an important asset for young people pur-
suing a political career. Chinese citizens aged 18 or older may vote in direct 
elections of people’s congresses at the village, township or district level; rep-
resentatives to higher people’s congresses are chosen through indirect elec-
tion. The results of these elections are seldom a surprise; CPC members domi-
nate people’s congresses at all levels, and only CPC members (i.e., about 6% 
of population) can hold top leadership positions, such as president, premier, 
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and chairperson of the NPC. Successful candidates for these three posts are 
first internally elected within the CPC, mainly through indirect elections at 
various levels, before being nominated to, and “endorsed” and appointed by, 
the NPC. In other words, existing Chinese political institutions and practices 
deprive members of other political parties and members without political 
affiliation any opportunity to become state leaders.
expansion of youths’ social participation in civil society 
and cyberspace
Despite structural constraints on political participation, the public space for 
Chinese youths with or without CPC membership to discuss and participate 
in social and public affairs has grown in the PRC since the 1980s. This can 
be partly attributed to the impact of social changes, the emergence of civil 
society and the rapid expansion of cyberspace. 
Firstly, Chinese youths are increasingly aware of their rights and free-
doms. Compared to their parents, most Chinese youths are more educated 
due to the success of EFA and post-EFA education, and live in a more afflu-
ent and pluralist society. Because they grew up amidst economic and social 
changes arising from the 1978 policy of reform and opening to the world, 
many young people are more pragmatic and less idealistic; have a stronger 
sense of competition and awareness of their personal rights and freedoms; 
lead a more diversified lifestyle in terms of friends, job choices, and con-
sumption behaviours; and tend to choose their personal development and 
social participation based on personal preferences (H. S. Li, 2008; X. Yang, 
2012). This description is certainly not a full picture of Chinese youths, and 
one can expect a lot of variations between individual youths. It does, how-
ever, offer a rough overview of Chinese youths.
Secondly, the emergence of civil society as an autonomous sphere for pub-
lic discourse and participation (McCormick, 1996) has provided new space in 
which Chinese youths may pursue their ideals, rights and freedoms. After 
China’s attitude towards civil society gradually changed from suppression to 
tolerance in the 1980s (Law, 2011), the number of officially recognized NGOs 
rose from 154,000, in 2000, to 462,000, in 2011 (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2001, 
2012), in areas ranging from social services to environmental protection. In 
2007, 34% of people who served and participated in NGOs were younger than 
35 (Su, 2011). A survey shows that, through such participation, youths en-
education, work, and citizenship of youth in china: strategies, achievements (…) 149
hance their social awareness and participation, develop social resources and 
networks, and facilitate the growth of civil society (Su, 2011). 
Moreover, youths can be a major source of volunteer services for local 
communities and international events (such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics 
and 2010 Shanghai World Exposition). They can also be a strong civic force 
striving for rights through demonstration. Although criticized for their lack 
of interest in politics (e.g., discussing political topics), many young people 
may suddenly gather together and participate in large-scale social dem-
onstrations (He & Huang, 2011). It is not uncommon for Chinese youths to 
participate in protests against local government that attempt land grabs, 
or approve the construction of petrochemical plants that might cause local 
environment pollution. 
Thirdly, the public space for Chinese youths’ social discussion and par-
ticipation has been broadened by the rapid expansion of cyberspace and of 
information and communication technologies (ICT). Since the first email 
was sent, in 1987, Internet and mobile-phone use in China has grown quick-
ly. According to the China Internet Network Information Center (2013), the 
number of Chinese netizens increased from 111 million (8.5% of China’s 2005 
population) to 564 million (42.1%) in 2012, while the number of Internet-
connected mobile phone users rose from 50 million (24% of netizens) in 
2007 to 420 million (74.5%) in 2012. In 2012, nearly 50% of netizens were 
children or youths (24% aged 10-19 and 30.4% aged 20-29) and 25.1% were 
students. Netizen’s top ten Internet usages were: instant messaging (83%); 
information search (80%); internet music (77%); blogs (66%); internet vid-
eos (66%); internet games (60%); microblogs (55%); social networking (49%); 
email (45%); and, internet shopping (43%). The PRC also had 309 million 
microblog accounts; 55% of microbloggers post using the Web, while 66% use 
internet-connected mobile phones (China Internet Network Information 
Center, 2013). Many Chinese youths use microblogs to express and commu-
nicate their views on important national and local issues, and to mobilize 
actions reflecting their concerns or dissatisfaction.
Fourthly, cyberspace can be an alternative platform in which many Chi-
nese youths can practise direct election. Although they cannot directly choose 
their national leaders, youths can directly vote, with the help of ICT, for their 
favourite songs and popular music idols, as when the Chinese public selected 
Li Yuchun as the winner of the 2005 nationwide singing contest, Super Girls, 
modelled after American Idol. On the night of the finale, some eight million 
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SMS (short message service) votes were casted, with Li winning by more than 
3.5 million votes (Jakes, 2005). In the same year, Li was named one of Asia’s 
heroes in a special issue of Times (Asia) Magazine. Her success in the competition 
was attributed partly to her fans’ continuous efforts to promote her singles 
and albums on the Internet, and casting ‘spoiler votes’ on webpages for dif-
ferent music charts (L. Yang, 2009). The contest was commended by Li (2008) 
for adopting important principles of democratic election: equal opportunity 
for participation and the adoption of an open, fair and just voting procedure. 
To some extent, election in a non-political arena serves as a good teaching ex-
ample of democratic election for the Chinese polity.
CONCLUSION
With reference to the PRC, the article has demonstrated that youth edu-
cation, work and citizenship can be influenced by changing domestic and 
global contexts, and that the state can play a vital role in facilitating these 
changes in three major spheres of youth. In the PRC, the 1978 policy of re-
form and opening to the world brought forth significant domestic economic 
and social changes and exposed China and its people to the world. All this, 
in turn, created new demands and concerns for the development of youth 
education, work and citizenship. 
The PRC’s need to reform its declining economy and increase its interna-
tional competitiveness, as shown earlier, required more and better Chinese 
manpower; this, therefore, helped increase Chinese youths’ access to EFA 
and post-EFA education. The economic reforms also forced the PRC to change 
its labour market from centrally planned to market oriented, and to create 
an opening for youths and employers to choose each other. Common to Chi-
na’s efforts to address youth education and employment needs was its use 
of law to protect youth rights by codifying important principles or norms 
promoted by the international community, despite the fact that more could 
and should be incorporated. To reify these rights, China expanded its educa-
tion by stages (the EFA in late 1980s and post-EFA education in the 1990s) and 
introduced measures to regulate the new relationships and problems arising 
from the new market-oriented labour market. 
In the PRC, youth education and employment are confronted by various 
challenges, including large-scale domestic migration, a challenge expected 
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to persist for decades, as China’s migrant population is expected to reach 350 
million in 2050 (National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2012). 
Such migration is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it has helped Chi-
na ease youth and young adult employment problems nationwide, turning 
them into a strong labour force and boosting the economy of host areas and 
China as a whole. It is also an essential means by which Chinese people en-
hance their employment opportunities and improve their quality of living. 
Young people are the foundation of China’s future economy and an essential 
source of migrant labour. 
On the other hand, the large-scale migration reveals deep-seated prob-
lems concerning the localization of important national rights to education 
and other social welfares in an increasingly mobilized Chinese society. In 
places outside their registered domicile in China, migrant workers and their 
children are often treated, structurally and socially, as second-class citizens, 
and are not entitled to receive the same social welfares, mainly provided and 
supported by host governments, as their local counterparts. To mitigate this 
kind of structural discrimination, China needs to step up its efforts to en-
sure equal rights for all its citizens wherever they are in China. To this end, 
China could reconsider, for example, delinking entitlements from household 
registration and making related structural and financial rearrangements 
between the central and local governments to facilitate the delinking, such 
as opening public secondary and higher education in host areas to migrant 
students, and fostering social integration and mutual understanding be-
tween migrants and locals. 
Compared to education and work, China has adopted far fewer interna-
tional norms and practices to enhance youths’ political and social participa-
tion. With a view to consolidating and sustaining CPC leadership, China has 
emphasised political work on campus and in the workplace, and reserved top 
national leadership posts to CPC members. In contrast, regardless of their 
political affiliation, the space Chinese youth have for direct social involve-
ment and participation in local and national communities and affairs has 
been enhanced by the state’s toleration of the expansion of both civil society 
and cyberspace. As such, Chinese youths and others are caught in a growing 
dilemma between limited political participation and increasing expansion 
of social participation.
A question that might worry China is, when will the widening discrepan-
cy between political and social participation become a national political tide 
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demanding giving the Chinese polity equal opportunity for participation 
and competition in political elections? It is very difficult to separate com-
pletely political and social spaces. Although it remains to be seen whether 
the popularization of ICT will increase Chinese netizens’ political participa-
tion to such an extent that it could “ignite a prairie fire of revolutionary, 
democratic change”, it has already helped create “new spaces for individual 
self-expression and interest-group mobilization” (Leibold, 2011, p. 1036). Ex-
posure to and participation in cyberspace could help Chinese youths acquire 
more knowledge about the concepts of equality, freedom, democracy and 
human rights (H. S. Li, 2008). Despite China’s strong cyber-censorship, the 
popularization of ICT has helped turn Chinese netizens, including millions 
of youths, into a new powerful civic force by providing them with a broader 
and more convenient platform for expressing and discussing views on gov-
ernment policies and current national and local issues and affairs, and an 
efficient tool for calling for social action and protests. As increasing num-
bers of Chinese youths and adults participate in civil society and cyberspace, 
how to make the Chinese political system fairer, more open, and more just in 
the competition for political power, regardless of political affiliation, is an 
important challenge for China in the 21st century.
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